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WATER POLLUTION

dress grievances that are inextricably wound with much larger social,
political and economic problems. While outlawing certain discriminatory credit-granting practices, the amendments do not challenge the
catch-22 of the underlying economic system. Credit is often denied
because the applicant does not have a credit history; for many this vicious circle cannot be broken. Persons with low incomes are often unable to obtain loans though they may be perfectly capable of slowly
repaying a small loan. And because credit has become so integral a
part of the American economic system 5 ' the individual defined as a
"bad" credit risk all too frequently turns to the thriving underworld of
loan sharks and extortionists.
And yet if credit is going to remain an important tool for improving the standard of living, as well as for aiding the individual through
temporary periods of financial difficulty, it is imperative that such a tool
be universally available. If the amendments result in efforts on the
part of lending institutions to reassess established credit scoring schemes,
as well as in greater consumer imderstanding of creditors' lending criteria, they should be called a success.5 2
DONNA HELEN TRiPTOW

Federal Jurisdiction-Environmental Law-Do Private Citizens
Have a Right To Bring Action To Abate Water Pollution Under
Federal Common Law?
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of .1972'
set, a goal of ending all pollutant discharges into navigable waters by
1985.2 This lofty goal will be difficult to obtain 8 even with congres51. "Between . . . 1950 and 1971 consumer credit outstanding rose from $21.5
billion to $137.2 billion, an increase of over five times . .

. ."

NCCF REPoRT, supra

note 21, at 5.
52. The legislation, however, does not address the problems created by an everincreasing national, corporate and individual debt. This increased debt is one manifestation of the "rising expectations" politicians have taught us to fear, but we are continually urged to "relax" and "charge it."
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376"(Supp. V 1975).
2. Id. § 1251(a) (1).
3. McThenia, An Examination of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972, 30 WASH.& LEE L Rnv. 195, 208 (1973).
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sionally mandated state and federal cooperation.4 In Committee for
the Consideration of the Jones Fall Sewage System v. Train," the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals turned down an opportunity to become
involved in pollution control by further judical expansion of "specialized federal common law." The court held that private citizens have
no federal common law right to enjoin intrastate water pollution that
is not enjoinable under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972.1
The Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage
System complained that the city of Baltimore was discharging sewage
into Jones Falls Stream. Plaintiffs first sought injunctive relief under
the federal water pollution statutes,8 but it soon appeared that they had
no cause of action under the statutes because the city had submitted
an application for a discharge permit under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k),
which provides that discharges will not be a statutory violation during
the pendency of a proper application. The authorizing agency found
that the city was meeting the statutory standards and a permit was issued during the pendency of the litigation. The issuance of the permit
prevented any relief under the federal statute, so plaintiffs amended
their complaint to allege a federal common law right of action for
an injunction ° against additional connections to the sewer system that
4. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. V 1975).
5. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
6. For a discussion of the development of "specialized federal common law"
since the ban on "generalized federal common law" in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), see Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U.L R .383 (1964).
7. 539 F.2d at 1007.
8. Id.
9. (Supp. V 1975). This section states in part:
Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to that section shall be deemed
compliance [with all statutory standards, except those imposed] for a toxic
pollutant injurious to human health. Until December 31, 1974, in any case
where a permit for discharge has been applied for pursuant to this section,
but final administrative disposition of such application has not been made,
such discharge shall not be a violation of [statutory standards], unless the
Administrator or other plaintiff proves that final administrative disposition
of such application has not been made because of the failure of the applicant
to furnish information reasonably required or requested in order to process
the application.
10. Injunctions for abatement of pollution have been granted on federal common
law grounds. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Texas v. Pankey,
441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). Illinois involved a state seeking an injunction against
a city of another state to abate water pollution. The Court felt that the national
interest in pollution control and the interstate nature of the parties made it inappropriate to subject either party to the laws and processes of a foreign state, and consequently applied federal common law to permit the injunctive relief. 406 U.S. at 10108.
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was discharging pollutants into the stream."
In the district court defendants moved to dismiss the complaint,
alleging that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or if
jurisdiction was found, that the district court should elect not to exercise
it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.' 2 Defendants based their
allegation of lack of subject matter jurisdiction on two premises: (1)
that private citizens could not invoke federal common law to abate
intrastate pollution of navigable waters, and (2) that the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act preempted the federal
common law.' 3 The district court held that only governmental units
could invoke the federal common law cause of action to abate pollution
of navigable waters,' 4 and thus found it unnecessary to consider whether

the 1972 amendments preempted the federal common law. 15
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision and concluded that the amended complaint stated no claim

upon which relief could be granted.' 6 In reaching its decision the court
of appeals indicated four reasons for not recognizing a body of federal

common law conferring rights upon private citizens to enjoin pollution
of intrastate waters not enjoinable under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972. The court first relied upon the Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins 7 ban on general federal common law.1 8

The

11. 539 F.2d at 1008.
12. Committee v. Train, 375 F. Supp. 1148, 1149 (D. Md. 1974). The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is often invoked when an administrative agency has been created
to deal with problems that arise in a particular area, such as pollution control. The
court will invoke that doctrine to deny jurisdiction to a plaintiff when it feels that
the administrative agency is the proper body to decide the particular claim, or that
plaintiff should exhaust any possible administrative remedies before the court grants
jurisdiction. For a good discussion of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in environmental litigation, see Hoffman, The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction Misconceived:
End To Common Law Environmental Protection?, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. Ruv. 491 (1974).
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals in Committee v. Train discussed
or relied upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in its decision.
13. 539 F.2d at 1011 (dissenting opinion); 375 F. Supp. at 1153-55.
14. 375 F. Supp. at 1153-54. The district court felt that the federal common
law respecting waters should be limited to governmental entities because it developed
in disputes between states and the rationale of preventing subjection of one state to
the laws and courts of another did not apply to disputes between citizens. Id.
15. 539 F.2d at 1011 (dissenting opinion); 375 F. Supp. at 1155.
16. 539 F.2d at 1010.
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Justice Brandeis concluded that there was "no federal
general common law." Id. at 78. Brandeis' decision was based upon considerations
of the allocation of power in a federal system. Friendly, fupra note 6, at 394-95;
Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARv.L. REv. 1, 10 (1975).
18. 539 F.2d at 1008. Until the Erie decision federal courts were often developing generalized federal common law to settle disputes, and this practice spread to substantive areas where no congressional action had been taken. Erie stopped the advance-
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court of appeals acknowledged that a body of "new federal common

law""8 respecting waters has developed,"0 but it distinguished the Committee v. Train case from earlier cases 2 that had recognized a federal
common law right to abate water pollution. As a second reason for
denial of plaintiff's requested relief, the court recognized a distinction
between governmental entity plaintiffs22 in the earlier cases and private

citizen plaintiffs in Committee v. Train.2 3 The court's third ground for
not applying the federal common law respecting waters was that Committee v. Train involved an intrastate stream rather than interstate

waters.24 The fourth reason given by the court of appeals was that the
1972 act of Congress preempted 25 any federal common law that would
proscribe conduct permitted under the Act.20
An understanding of the development of federal common law
since the Erie decision is necessary to analyze properly the, basis for
the court of appeals' decision in Committee v. Train. On the same day
that Erie banned federal common law, the Supreme Court in Hinderlider
v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. 27 began to develop "specment of federal common law into areas of state rather than federal concern, but soon
after Erie the federal courts began to develop specialized federal common law in areas
of federal concern. See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 10-14. See generally Friendly,
supra note 6.
19. Friendly, supra note 6.
20. 539 F.2d at 1008-09; see Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Texas
v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
21. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236
(10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110
(D. Vt.) ajf'd mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Scott
v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
22. See cases cited note 21 supra.
23. 539 F.2d at 1009.
24. Id. at 1009-10.
25. Id. For a summary of the statutory provision legitimatizing discharges pursuant to a permit, see note 9 supra.
26. 539 F.2d at 1009. In a dissenting opinion Judge Butzner stated that there
is a federal interest in ending pollution in Jones Falls Stream because of its effect
on the Chesapeake Bay and because it is within the broad definition of navigable
waters that Congress and the courts have determined to be under federal control. Id.
at 1011-13. Butzner argued that the 1972 amendments are further evidence of a national interest in allowing plaintiffs relief in that the amendments provide private citizens with the right to bring suits to enforce effluent standards and preserve any common
law cause of action. Id. Butzner recognized the specific statement in Illinois v. Milwaukee that federal common law applied to "navigable waters" rather than just interstate waters, and that Illinois was not limited to suits brought by states. Id. at 1013.
The dissenting opinion emphasized the fact that it would be inconsistent to allow state
courts to fill federal interstices. Id. at 1014. After concluding that plaintiffs had
standing because of their particular injuries, Judge Butzner said that any preemption
question should be decided only upon a consideration of the merits.- Id. at 101416.
27. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
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ialized federal common law."' 28 In resolving a controversy concerning
interstate waters, the Court in Hinderlider concluded that federal
courts should fashion federal common law when the interstate nature

of a dispute makes it inappropriate that the law of either state should
govern.2 9
In Illinois v. Milwaukee 0 the Supreme Court relied partially on

federal common law respecting disputes among the states, developed
in Hinderlider and subsequent cases, 3 ' to recognize a federal common
law cause of action to abate pollution of navigable waters.3 2 The
state of Illinois sought an injunction to abate pollution of Lake Michigan by the city of Milwaukee.33 The Court felt the interstate nature
of the dispute and the national interest in pollution control merited
relief under the federal common law.3 4

The basic rationale behind

the generation of federal common law to govern interstate disputes
was said to be the necessity for avoiding subjection of one state's rights
to an adjudication in the forum of another state or under the laws of

another state.3 5
Many other areas of specialized federal common law have developed 6 since Hinderlider. Much of the federal common law has developed in response to a broad exception contained in Erie itself:
28. Friendly, supra note 6, at 405.
29. 304 U.S. at 110.
30. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
31. See, e.g., Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974); Texas v. New
Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965). See generally Monaghan, supranote 17, at 14.
32. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104-05 (1972); Texas v. Pankey, 441
F.2d 236, 239-40 (10th Cir. 1971).
33. 406 U.S. at 93-94.
34. Id. at 105-08.
35. See id. at 104-05; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907);
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); Monaghan, supra note 17, at 14.
36. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Line, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 381-403 (1970)
(maritime law); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964)
(foreign relations); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)
(overriding national interest).
A simple classification of the areas in which federal common law has developed is
not easy to obtain. . In Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 H~Av. L REv. 1512,
1519-26 (1969), one commentator has listed three categories of federal common law.
The first category contains those cases that developed federal common law from the
concept of national sovereignty, such as Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964). A second category includes those cases that developed federal common law because Congress has expressly or impliedly authorized the courts to develop
law in an area. Examples of express authorization to the cQurts to develop law in
an area are the Rules Enabling Acts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072 (1970). The third
category includes those cases that have created federal common law to formulate remedies for the breach of duties imposed by federal laws. An example of a court-created remedy for a breach of a duty imposed by federal legislation is the creation
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"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by the
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State. ' 37 The most significant expansion of specialized federal common
law has been in matters governed by acts of Congress. 3 Federal courts
used specialized federal common law to fulfill legislative intent and
fill federal statutory interstices. 39
In Committee v. Train the Fourth Circuit observed that Erie had
banned general federal common law and stated that tho facts presented did"not justify the application of specialized common law that
had developed since Erie.40 In particular, the court examined and
rejected the line of cases that had evolved to settle interstate disputes. 41 The court noted that the rationale of protecting one state
from subjection to another state's laws or courts42 applied only to cases
involving governmental entities complaining of pollution that was of
an interstate character,43 and not to cases involving private citizens
complaining of pollution of a local nature." The court's distinction
between the Committee v. Train case and many earlier cases" ihat
had applied federal common law to solve interstate disputes is sound;
however, the court failed to consider other areas of federal common
law development that might have been appropriate in the Committee
v. Train context. Although the court was correct when it stated that
the Supreme Court in Illinois had given the interstate nature of the
of a private cause of action in Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d
Cir. 1947), against a violation of an act of Congress making it a crime to intercept
and divulge a telephone conversation.
37. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (emjhasis added).
38. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 10-14; see Friendly, supra note 6, at 405-22.
39. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957)
(contracts between employers and labor organizations affecting interstate "commerce);
DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (patents and copyrights); Francis
v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450 (1948) (interstate carrier statutes); Huber
Baking Co. v. Stroehmanrn Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1958) (unfair
competition affecting interstate commerce).
40. See text accompanying notes 17-24 supra.
41. 539 F.2d at 1011 (dissenting opinion).
42. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
43. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,
514 F.2d 492, 520, 521, 532 (8th Cir. 1975); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt.),
aft'd mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973). But see United States ex rel. Scott v.
United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. "556 (N.D. Ill. 1973), in which it was held
that Illinois, as well as the United States, has a right of action to abate water pollution even when no interstate effect.was alleged. Illinois was allowed to rely on federal
common law to abate pollution discharges from its own banks into Lake Michigan.
44. 539 F.2d at 1008-10.
45. See cases cited note 43 supra.
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dispute and parties as a reason for its decision, 46 it failed to note that
in that decision the Supreme Court also put great emphasis upon the
national interest in water pollution control in its determination that
there was a federal common law with respect to water pollution.47
An analysis of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and the history behind those amendments might have
convinced the court that the pollution of Jones Falls Stream was a
proper situation for application of specialized federal common law to fulfill federal legislative intent or to fill federal statutory interstices.48
The goals of the '1972 amendments 49 are even stronger evidence of
the national interest in pollution control than the water.pollution legislation existing at the time of Illinois."" The court's concern in Committee v. Train that the pollution was not interstate might have been
nullified by investigation into what waters are now considered subject
to congressional control. The 1972 amendments apply to "navigable
waters," which are defined as "waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas."'" Legislative history discloses that Congress intended "navigable waters" to "be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation, 52 and the Environmental Protection Agency has
stated that the Act extends to tributaries of navigable waters.5 With
this broad range of waters encompassed by the statute it may logically
be asserted that Congress intended to reach pollutant discharges in
the waters of Jones Falls Stream that eventually flow into the Chesapeake Bay;54 otherwise, the congressional goal of elimination of pollution in navigable waters by 1985 would be jeopardized.
The court's distinction in Committee v. Train between citizen
plaintiffs and governmental entity plaintiffs 5 is also weakened by an
analysis of the portion5" of the 1972 amendments that authorizes citizens' suits to enforce certain provisions of the Act. This extension
of federal rights to individual citizens could have been relied upon by
46. 406 U.S. at 103-05.
47. Id. at 101-04. The Supreme Court felt that federal legislative attempts to
limit water pollution demonstrated the national interest in pollution control.
48. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
50. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. V 1975).
52. S. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 3776, 3822.
53. 40 C.F.R. § 125.1(p) (2) (1976).
54. 539 F.2d at 1011 (dissenting opinion).
55. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. V 1975).
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the court as demonstrating a congressional intention that citizens be
allowed the same rights as governmental entities under federal pollution laws, whether they be statutory laws or decisional common laws.
The provision for citizen suits should be evidence of a national interest
in allowing citizens to enter the fight against pollution. The validity
of the distinction between the citizen plaintiff and the governmental
entity plaintiffs is further weakened by the Supreme Court's refusal
common law solely upon
in Illinois to base its application of federal
7
disputes.1
the
in
parties
the
of
the nature
The court's holding that the 1972 amendments preempted any
federal common law right58 must also be considered largely in light
of the legislative intent. The court's reasoning that federal common
law could not prohibit something that had been specifically permitted
by Congress seems to be sound logically, but further investigation reveals some support for the continued viability of the federal common
law. First, it should be noted that 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) provides that
pollutant discharges allowed under a permit are not violation of the
statute,5 9 but nothing within that provision says that compliance with
the statute is compliance with the federal common law.60 As is characteristic of environmental legislation, the 1972 amendments preserve
"any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under
any statute or common law." 61 This statutory clause preserves federal
common law rights as well as state common law rights.0 2 In Illinois
57. "[]t is not only the character of the parties that requires us to apply federal
common law." 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.
58. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (Supp. V 1975).
60. At least two commentators believe- that satisfaction of pollution control standards established by a legislature does not create a defense to a. common" law action
to abate a nuisance. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 505-07; Maloney, Judicial Protection
of the Environment: A New Role for Common-Law Remedies, 25 VND. L. REV.
145, 156-57 (1972). Hoffman cites, inter alia, the following cases as supportive of
his view: Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Eastern Shore Natural Gas Co.
v. Staufer Chem. Co., - Del. -, 298 A.2d 322 (1972); State ex rel. Shevin v. Tampa
Elec. Co., 291 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 297 So. 2d 571 (Fla.
1974); J.D. Jewell, Inc. v. Hancock, 226 Ga. 480, 175 S.E.2d 847 (1970); Lexington
v. Cox, 481 S.W.2d 645 (Ky. 1972). Maloney compared the effect of statutory pollution control standards to that of statutory standards in negligence cases, saying that
just as in negligence cases compliance with the statutory standard should not acquit
the defendant of any charges based upon an alleged violation of common law standards. Maloney cited the following cases for his position that compliance with statutory
standards is not conclusive on the question whether reasonable care has been exercised:
Mitchell v. Hotel Berry Co., 34 Ohio App. 259, 171 N.E. 39 (1929); Curtis v. Perry,
171 Wash. 542, 18 P.2d 840 (1933).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (Supp. V 1975).
62. 539 F.2d at 1011 (dissenting opinion). For support of this view see note
60 supra and cases cited therein.
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the Supreme Court said that the use of federal common law to abate
pollution of navigable waters is permissible even though the remedy
sought was not within the scope of remedies prescribed under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.63 In United States v. Ira S. Bushey and Sons, Inc.,64 the court stated:
What is important about Illinois v. City of Milwaukee ...
is the declaration there that the numerous laws Congress has
enacted to prohibit or control pollution of interstate or navigable
waters do not establish in themselves the exclusive means by which
the federal policy concerning, and interest in, the quality of waters
under federal jurisdiction may be protected in the federal courts. 65
Committee v. Train is a significant limitation on the judicial expansion of specialized federal common law. Several commentators
have expressed concern that federal courts are increasingly asserting
federal common law in new'and unusual areas.6 6 The fear of expanding federal common law arises because such decisions bind state
courts through the supremacy clause and allow judicial action in areas
67
where power had been delegated only to Congress.
Committee v. Train is also significant because of its possible adverse effect on pollution enforcement and the realization of the goals
set by the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. While
the decision involved intrastate parties that arguably should be subject
to state common law, the holding of the court seems to deny all private
citizens access to the federal common law respecting water pollution.
This denial may not be so harsh when the alleged nuisance is nearby
and within the same state, but when a private citizen of one state is
injured by a nuisance originating in another state, the denial of any
access to federal common law to the injured individual dna the consequent subjection of that individual to the laws and courts of the state
where the nuisance originates appear harsh indeed. An injured individual's rights to a remedy should not be any different from the right
63. 406 U.S. at 103. It should be noted that the Illinois decision also said that
future federal laws might preempt the federal common law. Id. at 107. The 1972
amendments, however, specifically preserve common law rights. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)
(Supp. V 1975).
64. 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972).
65. Id. at 149.
66. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 10-11; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82
HAIv.L: REv. 1512 (1969).
67. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 10-11. Monaghan expresses concern that the
federal courts are allowed to act in areas normally left only to Congress, but are
not subject to the political checks imposed on Congress. Id. at 11.
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of an injured state. Even if the courts and laws of the injured individual's state were allowed to adjudicate the matter "under modem
principles of the scope of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction,168 the right of the alleged polluter would be determined by the
laws and courts of another state. In either case, one citizen would
be subjected to the laws and courts of. a state where he had not performed any act. Furthermore, this subjection could be particularly
ominous in the area of nuisance law, which normally involves balancing of interests.69
In addition to any problems that an injured individual might face
in asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident, there is always the problem of enforcing extraterritorial injunctive decrees, especially when
there is suspicion of partiality of judgment. 70 All these problems
arising from an interstate pollution dispute suggest that the Committee
v. Train denial of a federal common law cause of action to allow private citizens to abate pollution should be limited to its particular facts
of intrastate citizens and should not extend to private citizens of dif71
ferent staies.
The court of appeals could have expanded the specialized federal common law to accommodate the private plaintiffs in Committee
v. Train and supported that decision with an interpretation of legislative intent and a statement of national interest in water pollution
abatement. It seems that the court balanced the evil of invading further the ideology of Erie and opposing specific statements of the
Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 with the possible benefit
that allowing citizens suits under federal common law might have on
ending certain types of water pollution. Apparently, it concluded
that it was better to avoid the evils rather than pursue the uncertain
benefit.
BRUCE

M. SIMPSON

68. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 500 (1971). Mr. Justice
Harlan suggested that the courts of the injured party's state would have jurisdiction
and the laws of the injured party's state would apply in a suit by an injured party
against a polluter of another state.
69. Note, Federal Jurisdiction-EnvironmentalLaw-Nuisance-State Ecological
Rights Arising Under Federal Common Law, 1972 Wis. L. Rav. 597, 608-09.
70. "Mhe efficacy of any relief granted too often depends on the cooperation
of a sister state's legal machinery in carrying out the injunction." Id. at 609 n.60.
71. The denial of access to the federal common law to private citizens also will
hinder the achievement of uniformity of laws in an area of express national interest
and concern.

